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The Strawhorsemen of the Apocalypse:
Relativism and the Historian as Expert
Witness
by
REUEL E. SCHILLER*
What happens, Daniel Farber asks in his fascinating contribution
to this symposium, when expert witnesses belong to a discipline that
is no longer committed to objective notions of the truth? In particu-
lar, how do we preserve the integrity of the trial process when histo-
rians who are called upon to testify about historical facts accept a
relativist epistemology that allows them to manipulate the truth to
suit their ideological needs? According to Farber, historical relativ-
ism, post-modernism, multiculturalism, and critical legal studies have
emerged as the four horsemen of the apocalypse, forming an unholy
alliance that threatens to disrupt truth-finding in the judicial system.
The problem with Farber's paper is that these are not the four
horsemen of the apocalypse but rather the four strawhorsemen. Re-
ports of objectivity's demise, at least within the historical profession,
are premature. Furthermore, the nature of the trial process prevents
the abuses that Farber fears. By focusing his attack on these straw-
horsemen, Farber ignores a more serious threat to the integrity of the
past: falsehoods, myths, and ideologically-biased narratives mas-
querading as truths under the banner of objectivity. These are more
corrosive of the political and legal discourse than the intellectually
opaque theories about the subjective nature of truth that trouble
Farber.
Since Peter Novick's That Noble Dream was published in 1988,
there has been much talk among historians about how our profession
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is awash in subjectivist history. Yet, finding a genuinely "subjectivist
historian" is rather like searching for a unicorn. After seven years in
graduate school and at least as many attending history conferences, I
have yet to meet a historian who claimed that his scholarship was
nothing more than fiction or that his "version" of the events he stud-
ied was not an attempt to ascertain the truth. The historical profes-
sion is, at its core, profoundly committed to a search for truth about
the past. Consider, for example, the story of David Abraham that
Farber briefly mentions.' Abraham was an untenured history profes-
sor who was driven out of the profession by two eminent historians.
Their indictment against Abraham was that his book about the rela-
tionship between big business and the rise of National Socialism in
Germany contained numerous factual errors. Though Abraham cor-
rected his errors and demonstrated that they did not affect the valid-
ity of his thesis, his detractors saw his sloppy archival research as
symptomatic of the willingness of leftist historians to put political
ideology above historical truths in their research. Even assuming this
was what Abraham intended to do, which I do not,2 the story does
not indicate that believers in objective historical truth are under siege
in the profession. Quite the contrary. Abraham's detractors won
out. "Objectivity" was a potent weapon in their successful campaign
to drum him out of the profession.
Consider also the profession's response to Simon Schama's book
Dead Certainties. Schama decided that he would write a work of fic-
tion based on historical research he had done. He wished to specu-
late on the results of his research without the usual restrictions re-
garding proof and evidence imposed on historical monographs.
Despite his disclaimers,3 the profession reacted to the book as if it
were poison. As Schama put it, he was "held guilty of committing a
fiction."4 Dead Certainties, its detractors claimed, undermined objec-
1. See Daniel A. Farber, Adjudication of Things Past: Reflections on History as
Evidence, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1009, 1026 (1998).
2. There is no evidence that Abraham was committed to any sort of relativist epis-
temology or that he purposely misreported facts in order to support an ideological
agenda. Indeed, many have accused his detractors of furthering their own ideological in-
terests-which seem to have been to rid the profession of Marxist historians-at the ex-
pense of historical truths about the fall of the Weimar Republic. See PETER NOVICK,
THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE "OBJECTIVITY QUESTION" AND THE AMERICAN
HISTORICAL PROFESSION 619 n.60 (1988).
3. SIMON SCHAMA, DEAD CERTAINTIES: (UNWARRANTED SPECULATIONS) 320
(1991).
4. Gordon Wood, Novel History, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS, June 27, 1991, at 12 (re-
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tivity, made a farce of genuine scholarship, and weakened the pub-
lie's faith in historians.5 Unlike Abraham, Schama had tenure as well
as a reputation that could weather the storm of criticism he received.
Abraham's and Schama's experiences hardly indicate that historians
are no longer committed to finding historical truths. Indeed, the exis-
tence of objective truth seems to be something that a historian can
question only at great peril.
Since the profession is committed to the pursuit of truth, where
do these accusations of subjectivity come from? Why do Farber and
other non-historians, as well as many historians, seem to fear that his-
tory departments are soon to be abolished, their faculties incorpo-
rated into fiction writing programs? I believe there are four answers.
to this question.
1. The Success of That Noble Dream
In That Noble Dream, Novick examines how American histori-
ans' beliefs about the existence of historical truths changed from the
late nineteenth century to the present. The book is well-written,
thoughtfully researched, and powerfully argued. It is also full of de-
lightful academic gossip. This combination of appealing attributes
guaranteed it a wide readership among historians. Accordingly, the
"objectivity debate" received a very wide airing.6 That Noble Dream
revealed, as does Farber's piece, that there are some scholars in the
profession who disparage the idea of searching for historical truths.'
This fact does not indicate how influential these ideas are or whether
they affect the work of a majority of practicing historians. However,
by exposing their existence and discussing their ideas seriously, No-
vick caused a negative reaction among historians concerned with the
reputation of their profession.' Suddenly, an "objectivity crisis" as-
viewing SIMON SCHAMA, DEAD CERTAINTIES (1991)).
5. See Wood, supra note 4; see also Linda Colley, Fabricating the Past, TIMES
LITERARY SUPP., June 14, 1991, at 5 (reviewing SIMON SCHAMA, DEAD CERTAINTIES
(1991)).
6. Novick's discussion of contemporary historians' movement away from objectivist
epistemologies is but a small part of his larger study of how American historians have
thought about truth since the late nineteenth century. I can only imagine Novick's con-
sternation that the last quarter of his book generated such controversy while the first
three quarters went essentially undiscussed.
7. See Novick, supra note 2, at 599-605.
8. Colley's review of DEAD CERTAINTIES demonstrates a notable fear for the dis-
cipline's reputation. See Colley, supra note 5.
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sumed titanic proportions.
2. The Widespread Recognition that Getting at the Truth is
Difficult
While a vast majority of historians view their scholarship as a
search for truth, they also recognize that finding the truth can be
problematic. Subjectivity must be distinguished from healthy skepti-
cism. Farber quotes Novick: "The notion of objectivity promotes an
unreal and misleading distinction between historical accounts 'dis-
torted' by ideological assumptions and history free of these traits."9
I'm not sure that this quote indicates an abandonment of objective
truth. Rather, it recognizes that the truth can be hard to discern.
Typical graduate training in history has an objective component
and a subjective component. The objective component consists of re-
searching and writing a dissertation-searching for a historical truth
in a particular area. The subjective component is historiography-
reading the works of historians and examining how they have
differing, sometimes opposing, interpretations of historical events.
Studying historiography also involves examining how the conscious
and subconscious biases of historians affect their work. The purpose
of this subjective component of graduate education is not to turn
graduate students into radical anti-foundationalists. Instead, it
teaches skepticism and critical reading skills. It teaches you to be
cautious of your own biases and to be suspicious of others'.
Uncovering the truth is not impossible, but it is very difficult.
Indeed, the debates going on at the trials that Farber recounts are
historiographical ones that, because of their stakes, have taken on an
acrimony that rarely arises in a seminar room. The existence of these
debates, or the fact that each side accuses the other of bias, is not a
denial of the existence of objective truth. It is just a dialogue (or
screaming match) among historians who are taught to be wary of
other people's biases.
3. Bringing in New Voices
While the success of Novick's book and the difficulty of the his-
torian's enterprise are two reasons why people have begun to doubt
9. See Daniel A. Farber, Adjudication of Things Past: Reflections on History as
Evidence, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1009, 1025 (1998) (quoting NOVICK, supra note 2, at 6).
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the profession's commitment to objectivity, alone they are not a suf-
ficient explanation. Both phenomena are too parochial in nature to
affect the public's perception of what historians do. Instead, the
public's image of historians has been more dramatically affected by
changes in the types of history that scholars are interested in and the
political consequences of these changes. Starting in the early 1960s,
historians began bringing new voices into historical narratives." The
existing narratives were devoid of poor people, women, African-
Americans, and other racial and ethnic minorities. By studying these
groups, historians sought to complete these narratives by adding ac-
tors to the drama. This trend towards expanding the scope of the his-
torical inquiry was an attempt to produce a more objective historical
narrative-a complete history rather than a partial one.
As part of this enterprise, many historians sought to understand
the people they were studying by examining how they perceived
events. Thus, the history they wrote was perspectival in that it ex-
plored how certain groups interpreted the world around them: what
slaves thought about being enslaved, what immigrants thought about
the process of immigration and assimilation, what southern whites
thought about the trial of the Scottsboro Boys." This was getting at
the truth, but a different truth than more traditional history sought
out. These historians wished to learn the truth about people's beliefs
and impressions, not the truth about some external event. They
wished to know, for example, whether southern whites thought the
Scottsboro Boys were guilty, not whether they actually were.
Certain segments of the public reacted negatively to this new
type of historical inquiry. By bringing in new voices, it undermined
many of America's most cherished myths. Was America a melting
pot or a place where immigrants were coercively assimilated? What
was a Native American to make of Manifest Destiny? Were the rail-
roads miracles of modern technology that brought the United States
limitless prosperity or dangerous machines that mangled human
limbs and disrupted traditional economic relationships? Historians
who explore these questions are engaged in the process of truth
seeking. Yet they are accused of revisionism, political correctness,
10. This story has been told many times, most recently by Joyce Appleby in her
presidential address to the American Historical Association. See Joyce Appleby, The
Power of History, 103 AMER. HIST. REV. 1, 4-5 (1998).
11. See EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES
MADE (1974); Gary Gerstle, Liberty, Coercion, and the Making of Americans, 84 J. AM.
HIST. 524 (1997); JAMES E. GOODMAN, STORIES OF ScOTrSBORO (1995).
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and subjectivity. 2 The sad fact is that many Americans have no de-
sire to learn a historical truth if it contradicts a preconception that
they hold about the past. 3 Accordingly, they berate historians who
seek out these uncomfortable truths and explore the perceptions of
people who have existed outside of the mainstream of American his-
tory. The tactic they frequently use is an accusation of subjectivity.
Historians are not seeking the truth but are instead out to hide it,
driven by an ideological desire to write "victims' history" and dispar-
age our nation. In fact, the truth is often hard to take, and the pro-
fession has paid the price, in accusations of subjectivity, for aggres-
sively seeking it.
12. See GARY B. NASH, CHARLOTTE CRABTREE, AND Ross E. DUNN, HISTORY ON
TRIAL: CULTURE WARS AND THE TEACHING OF THE PAST (1997). These accusations
are part of the huge literature about "political correctness" in the American academy.
The grandpere of this genre is Dinesh D'Souza's quasi-factual ILLIBERAL EDUCATION:
THE POLITICS OF RACE AND SEX ON CAMPUS (1991). For critiques noting D'Souza's
tendency to play fast and loose with facts see JOHN K. WILSON, THE MYTH OF
POLITICAL CORRECTNESS: THE CONSERVATIVE ATTACK ON HIGHER EDUCATION 69-
72 (1995); John Weiner, What Happened at Harvard, in BEYOND P.C. TOWARDS A
POLITICS OF UNDERSTANDING 97-106 (Patricia Auferheide ed., 1992). Even a sympa-
thetic reviewer of ILLIBERAL EDUCATION admitted that "the book turned out to contain
some serious and irresponsible factual errors." C. Vann Woodward, Freedom and the
Universities, in BEYOND P.C. TOWARDS A POLITICS OF UNDERSTANDING, supra. at 27.
D'Souza attacks multi-culturalism in ILLIBERAL EDUCATION, supra, at 59-93. For other
examples of accusations of political correctness, subjectivity, and revisionism aimed at
those who would expand the historical or literary canon, see MARTIN ANDERSON,
IMPOSTORS IN THE TEMPLE 145-57 (1992); ROGER KIMBALL, TENURED RADICALS:
How POLITICS HAS CORRUPTED HIGHER EDUCATION 27-33, 63-75, 166-89 (1990):
ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 356-82 (particularly 366 n.17)
(1987); Thomas Short, "Diversity" and "Breaking the Disciplines": Two New Assaults on
the Curriculum, in ARE YOU POLITICALLY CORRECT? DEBATING AMERICA'S
CULTURAL STANDARDS 91-117 (Francis J. Beckwith & Michael E. Bauman eds., 1993)
[hereinafter POLITICALLY CORRECT]; Irving Howe, The Vahte of the Canon, in
POLITICALLY CORRECT, supra, at 133, 133-46; Allan Bloom, Western Civ--and Me: An
Adress at Harvard University, in POLITICALLY CORRECT, supra, at 147, 147-61; John R.
Searle, Is There a Crisis in American Higher Education?, in OUR COUNTRY, OUR
CULTURE: THE POLITICS OF POLITICAL CORRECTNESS (Edith Kurzweil & William Phil-
lips eds., 1994) at 227, 227-43; David Sidorsky, Multiculturalism and the University, in
OUR COUNTRY, OUR CULTURE, supra, at 244,244-57.
13. The controversy surrounding the Enola Gay exhibition at the Smithsonian is a
good, if profoundly depressing, example of this phenomena. See History and the Public:
What Can We Handle? A Round Table About History After the Enola Gay Controversy.
82 J. AM. HIST. 1029-1144 (1995).
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4. Historians in the Courtroom
The final factor that has contributed to this image of a subjectiv-
ist historical profession was a series of encounters between the legal
system and historians. Indeed, it is these incidents-the Sears sex
discrimination case, the Webster brief, the Colorado gay rights
case-that seem to give Farber the most concern. If historians are
not committed to seeking objective truths, then how can they claim to
be experts? Farber is worried that they have become nothing more
than advocates who use their authority as historians to hide the fact
that they are willing to make up whatever facts they need because
they do not believe that an objective truth exists.
Farber's concern is misplaced. Surely "Law Office History" or,
as one historian has eloquently put it, "the illicit relationship between
Clio and the Court,"'4 existed long before the rise of relativist episte-
mologies. As long as advocates exist, so will warped history. Con-
sider Justice Taney's opinion in Dred Scott 5or Justice Black's dissent
in Adamson v. California.1 6 Each is an example of the misuse of his-
tory-or perhaps I should say the use of fake history-to justify a
particular outcome. Yet nobody would accuse Taney or Black of
being epistemological relativists.
In addition to this age-old temptation to mold history to suit the
needs of litigants, the nature of the historian's search for truth-even
when such a search is completely bona fide-often does not mesh
well with the needs of the legal profession. When Alice Kessler-
Harris wrote about her experience testifying for the plaintiffs in the
Sears trial, she did not write about the need to shape her testimony to
the needs of the EEOC.7 Instead, she wrote about her intense frus-
tration with a trial process that did not allow her to explain the com-
plexities of the evolution of gendered conceptions of work.'8 A trial
often demands more than a historian can offer. It asks for definitive
answers when a historian may prefer to give cautious, conditional an-
14. Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SuP. Cr. REV.
119.
15. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
16. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 69-92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
17. As Kessler-Harris pointed out, she would not have been asked to testify if her
findings were incompatible with the position of the plaintiffs. Alice Kessler-Harris, Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sears, Roebuck and Company: A Personal Ac-
count, 35 RADICAL HIST. REv. 57, 63 (1986).
18. See id. at 72-75.
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swers. The law needs black and white, while historians often deal in
shades of gray. The currents of historical causation are multifaceted,
profoundly complicated, and often contradictory. Yet a trial has no
time for these subtleties. Indeed, discussing them leaves oneself open
to attack on cross-examination. As Kessler-Harris wrote:
Testimony had a double-edged quality. In this case, once given and
written, it had a life of its own, at the mercy of cross-examining
lawyers, and not subject to qualification. Because it constituted the
boundaries within which examination could happen, it had to en-
compass the totality of my expertise: broad enough to meet the
needs of the plaintiff, and yet sufficiently restrained as to offer few
loopholes that the defendants could use to undermine it. What sort
of claims to truth could be justified by such expertise? 9
Perhaps the problem is not that historians no longer believe in the
existence of historical truth, but instead that a trial is not always the
best way to discover it.
There is no doubt that historians came out of the trials that Far-
ber recounts looking bad. Furthermore, there is no excuse for the
behavior of the historians who seek to silence others who uncover
ideologically inconvenient truths. Yet, despite inflamed passions on
the part of the historians, the lesson I draw from these cases is that
the adversarial process is an excellent buffer against those who would
abuse historical truths in the interests of their client. Through the use
of rival experts and impeaching cross-examination, lawyers put histo-
rians' testimony through a crucible that uncovers biases, flawed data,
laughable interpretations, and outright deceit. That unicorn-like
creature, the relativist historian, who blatantly shapes the facts to suit
the needs of his client, may warp young minds in the classroom, but
he will be challenged and discredited in the courtroom. While histo-
rians debate the merits of Derridian relativism in their ivory tower,
the legal process is safe.
Farber ends his paper by stressing the potentially liberating na-
ture of historical inquiry. Objective truth, not historical relativism, is
the ally of democracy and the enemy of totalitarianism. 2' I whole-
19. 1d. at 74.
20. It seems to me that, contrary to the stories that Farber recounts, it is usually the
right that is coercing the left into silence. See JOHN K. WILSON, THE MYTH OF
POLITICAL CORRECTNESS 31-63 (1995); James Boyle, The P.C. Harangue, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 1457-60 (1993). Also, consider the story of David Abraham, supra note 2.
21. The association of post-modernism with fascism is a common trope in the writ-
ings of those who attack relativist epistemologies. To the extent that post-modern
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49
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heartedly agree with Farber. So I was forced to ask myself why por-
tions of his paper irked me so. Ultimately, I am disturbed by the ten-
dency of both liberal and conservative critics to make mountains of
relativist fascism from molehills of postmodem leftism. Where is the
inquiry about the other side in this so-called "culture war"? Who is
John Finnis and why does he seem to show up in a surprising number
of legal cases involving historical testimony, always on the same, con-
servative side? What about Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, another fre-
quent foot soldier in the culture wars, whose lapsed left-wing creden-
tials make her an attractive talking head for those opposed to the
"excesses of political correctness"? What about the hundreds of
other scholars, funded by the Olin Foundation or the Heritage Foun-
dation, whose scholarship-surprise, surprise-supports a particular,
conservative world View?' Trendy, left-wing relativism makes such
an easy target that we seem to have forgotten about the other side.
Farber's article presents the "problem" of instrumentalist schol-
arship as if it is only a phenomenon of the left. Perhaps the real
problem is that only the left attempts to rationalize its assaults on the
truth with zany epistemological models, more easily ridiculed than
understood. The right undertakes its campaign of misinformation
under the banner of objectivity, thereby hiding its biases. These
right-wing assaults on historical truths are more potent than those
propagated'by the left-leaning academics who, quite candidly, most
Americans had not heard of until Dinesh D'Sousa and Rush Lim-
baugh exposed their alleged depredations. Indeed, the right's abuses
of the truth are committed by those with a wide audience and a great
deal more media savvy, economic support, and political clout than
Peter Novick, Hayden White, or Gary Peller. Is it not time we dis-
cussed them? Let us not stay trapped in an ivory tower where liber-
als and leftists attack each other over issues of objectivity while the
rest of society listens to a well-financed and uncontested stream of
historical half-truths.
thought owes as much to Deweyan pragmatism as it does to Heiddeger or Paul De Man
this connection is mystifying. See generally RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE
MIRROR OF NATURE (1979); RICHARD RORTY, THE CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM
(1982); RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY (1989). This guilt
by association is like dismissing modem American poetry as totalitarian because of the
importance of Ezra Pound within the canon.
22. See JEAN STEFANIC AND RICHARD DELGADO, NO MERCY: How
CONSERVATIVE THINK TANKS AND FOUNDATIONS CHANGED AMERICA'S SOCIAL
AGENDA passim (1996); see also Wilson, supra note 20, at 26-30; Boyle, supra note 20, at
1460.
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